Abstract-Many peer-to-peer communities, including private BitTorrent communities that serve hundreds of thousands of users, utilize credit-based or sharing ratio enforcement schemes to incentivize their members to contribute. In this paper, we analyze the performance of such communities from both the system-level and the user-level perspectives. We show that both credit-based and sharing ratio enforcement policies can lead to system-wide "crunches" or "crashes," where the system seizes completely due to too little or too much credit, respectively. We present a theoretical model that identifies the conditions that lead to these system pathologies and we design an adaptive credit system that automatically adjusts credit policies to maintain sustainability. Given private communities that are sustainable, it has been demonstrated that they are greatly oversupplied in terms of excessively high seeder-to-leecher ratios. We further analyze the user-level performance by studying the effects of oversupply. We show that although achieving an increase in the average downloading speed, the phenomenon of oversupply has three undesired effects: long seeding times, low upload capacity utilizations, and an unfair playing field for late entrants into swarms. To alleviate these problems, we propose four different strategies, which have been inspired by ideas in social sciences and economics. We evaluate these strategies through simulations and demonstrate their positive effects.
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INTRODUCTION
I N decentralized collaborative systems, including peer-topeer (P2P) systems, providing incentives for user to contribute is essential. The well-known P2P file-sharing protocol BitTorrent owes its success to its Tit-For-Tat (TFT) incentive policy, which works reasonably well in fostering cooperation among downloaders (also known as leechers). However, TFT does not provide incentives for peers to remain in the system after their downloads are complete to seed the entire file. Therefore, peers are free to engage in "Hit and Run" behavior, leaving immediately upon completing their downloads.
To provide an incentive for seeding, in recent years there has been a proliferation of so-called private BitTorrent communities. These communities employ private trackers that maintain centralized accounts and record the download and upload activity of each user. They apply policies to incentivize good overall upload/download behavior. One such well-known policy is Sharing Ratio Enforcement (SRE), in which each member is required to keep its sharing ratio (the ratio between its total amounts of upload and download) at least equal to a threshold called the SRE threshold, which is set by the community administrator. Community members whose sharing ratios drop below the threshold are first warned and then banned from downloading, or even expelled from the community. Another such policy is the credit-based policy, which requires each member to maintain a positive credit (its total amount of upload minus its total amount of download). In this paper, we explore both the system-level dynamics and the userlevel performance in communities adopting such policies.
Considering a private community as an economic system, we analyze its system-level dynamics by studying its potential systemic risk. In economics, systemic risk is the risk of a collapse of an entire economic system or market [13] . We find that in private communities, too much credit distributed too evenly leads to a crash in which peers hold abundant credit and are not willing to contribute. Hence, the system seizes to zero throughput containing only leechers. Conversely, too little credit distributed over the peers leads to a crunch in which peers do not have enough credit to download, leading to a seized system containing only seeders. 1 Even when crashes or crunches do not occur, i.e., when the system is sustainable, this only ensures that the system is able to function, but not how well it functions. Though many measurement studies [7] , [15] , [16] , [21] have shown that the SRE-based and credit-based policies are very effective in boosting contribution levels in terms of high 1. A real world example of the crash and crunch is the story of the Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-op [11] , which was a group of parents who agreed to cooperate to babysit. A crunch happened when most people wanted to save up coupons: they looked for an opportunity to babysit but there was little demand. Later when more coupons were issued a crash happened: most people felt they had enough coupons so they did not want to babysit, leaving the system with huge demand but no supply.
seeder-to-leecher ratios (SLRs) and the corresponding high downloading speeds, we argue that the abundant supply of bandwidth also has several negative effects such as excessively long seeding times that are often unproductive.
To explore this, we analyze the user-level performance in sustainable private communities.
The main contributions of this paper are:
1. We demonstrate that in private communities credit crashes and crunches can occur and we identify conditions that lead to these extreme outcomes (Section 4); 2. We present a theoretical model that predicts whether a system will crash, crunch, or be sustainable over a defined time horizon. Based on this model, we propose an adaptive credit policy that helps the system to avoid crashes and crunches (Section 5); 3. We show that users in sustainable private communities achieve high downloading speeds but are forced to seed for excessively long times, during which their upload capacity utilizations are quite low (Section 6). Further, when the popularity of a swarm decreases over time, peers that join the swarm not early enough will have to seed much longer than peers who join (strategically) at the beginning of the swarm (Section 8); 4. We propose and evaluate four new strategies that alleviate these problems while still maintaining a reasonable system-wide downloading speed (Sections 7 and 8). We use private BitTorrent communities as an example, but our analysis is applicable to any system that adopts contribution enforcement policies, by generalizing the metrics for determining the credit and the sharing ratio from the upload and download amounts to any metrics representing contribution and consumption.
REAL-WORLD OBSERVATIONS
To support our later analysis, we first present real-world observations of two private communities, CHDBits.org [1] and Bitsoup.org [2] . CHDBits and Bitsoup both require the users to maintain sharing ratios larger than the threshold of 0.7. The trackers of CHDBits collect information that is periodically reported by the BitTorrent clients of its users, which is displayed in the form of HTML pages available to only its users. We crawled these trackers in May 2011. For each user in CHDBits, we collected the information on its user profile page including the upload and download amount, the seeding time, and the sharing ratio. For each torrent, we collected the information of its published date, and its numbers of seeders and leechers at the time of snapshot. In total, information on all the 31,547 registered users and 40,040 torrents was obtained. For Bitsoup, we use the traces published in [5] that report the user activity of 84,007 users in 13,741 torrents during a period of two months.
The Existence of Over-Seeding Behavior
In CHDBits, maintaining a sharing ratio slightly above the SRE threshold is sufficient for a user to start downloading a new file. However, we observe that not all the users behave like this. As shown in Fig. 1 , more than 95 percent of the users in CHDBits keep sharing ratios higher than 0.7 and more than 50 percent of the users keep them higher than 2. This phenomenon of peers seeding more than required and achieving sharing ratios that are (much) higher than the SRE threshold has also been observed in many other communities [15] .
From the above observation, we abstract two user behaviors for our later analysis, lazy-seeding and overseeding. Lazy-seeding peers (LSP) seed the minimum amount required by the enforcement policies. They represent the users who are download-oriented, i.e., who only seed enough to maintain adequate sharing ratios or credit to be able to start new downloads. On the other hand, overseeding peers (OSP) are deposit-oriented, and always maintain sharing ratios (much) higher than required. The behavior of such peers may be triggered by various motivations such as altruism, a desire to be part of the rich elite of the community, or a habit of storing credit for the future. In line with the terminology used in economics, over-seeding peers can be understood as hoarders as their behavior essentially amounts to hoarding credit.
The Oversupply
The main motivation for implementing credit or SRE policies is to close the gap between bandwidth demand and supply as observed in public BitTorrent communities, where there is significantly more demand than supply [16] . However, the presence of over-seeding peers completely reverses the situation and in private communities, swarms tend to be extremely oversupplied.
At the time of the crawling, CHDBits had 33,041 active swarms (with at least one leecher or one seeder), among which 26,402 swarms (79.9 percent) had no leechers at all! As shown in Fig. 2a, 40 percent of the swarms with no leechers still had at least five seeders, and for swarms with at least 1 leecher, the seeder-to-leecher ratio is quite high: as shown in Fig. 2b , 50 percent (5 percent) of these swarms had an SLR of at least 6 (30). We see clearly that a majority of the swarms are heavily oversupplied. Therefore, in such swarms, intuitively it is difficult for seeders to perform any actual uploads. We validate our speculation through the following observation.
Unproductive Seeding
It is clear that to achieve high sharing ratios, peers need to spend considerable amount of seeding time. In the case of over-seeding peers, long seeding times are to be expected. However, we observe that even many peers with small sharing ratios suffer from excessively long seeding times, and a significant part of their seeding time is spent idle without being able to upload anything to others. As a consequence, they have to wait for a long period until their sharing ratios are high enough to start new downloads. Fig. 3 shows the CDF of the fraction of idle seeding time of peers with sharing ratios smaller than 1 in BitSoup. We see that 10 percent of these peers spend at least half of their seeding time idle. Note that Fig. 3 only shows the fraction of idle seeding time. It can be conjectured that the fraction of seeding time that is not completely idle yet still yields very low upload speed, would be much higher. We term this situation as unproductive seeding and we hypothesize that it is due to the oversupply under credit-based or SREbased schemes.
MODEL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we explain the credit-based and SRE-based incentive policies, and our model of communities that employ one of these policies.
Credit-Based versus SRE-Based Policies
Credit-based and SRE-based policies are essentially very similar, in a way that they can be understood as variations of each other. The idea behind both policies is that every peer has to maintain a certain relation between the total amount uðtÞ it has uploaded and the total amount dðtÞ it has downloaded because it entered the community until time t. The credit-based policy requires users to keep nonnegative credit, i.e., to ensure that uðtÞ À dðtÞ ! 0, while the SRE-based policy requires users to keep a minimum sharing ratio SRðtÞ ¼ uðtÞ=dðtÞ, i.e., to ensure that SRðtÞ ! , where is the SRE threshold. Throughout this paper we assume 1, as most private communities do [2], [3] . When ¼ 1 in the SRE policy, the SRE-based and credit-based policies coincide.
By enforcing nonnegative credit in the credit-based policy, the exchanging of data by peers does not generate new credit, and the total amount of credit in the community is always equal to zero (or to the sum of the initial credits allocated to the peers by the community administrator). In contrast, an SRE-based policy allows users to have negative credit (i.e., to have uðtÞ À dðtÞ < 0, which means that SRðtÞ < 1). Holding negative credit increases the amount of credit among the peers with positive credit in the system-in other words, by holding negative credit a user is essentially minting credit. More precisely, the total credit minted by a user in an SRE-based community with SRðtÞ < 1 until time t is
which is bounded by ð1 À ÞdðtÞ. As the sharing ratios of peers fluctuate, SRE-based communities hold a dynamic amount of credit circulating in the system.
The Basic Model
We consider a community that is either credit based or SRE based. The community comprises a set of s swarms 2 each associated with a file of size F (expressed in number of pieces or units), and a set of N peers each with upload capacity U.
3 We assume no limit on the download capacity of peers. The download model follows the TFT mechanism in BitTorrent, with seeders uploading units to leechers and leechers exchanging units with each other. In reality, a peer can participate in multiple swarms simultaneously, with its bandwidth shared among all the swarms. However, because the sharing ratio is aggregated over all the swarms, we assume that at any time a peer only participates in one swarm, either as a leecher or a seeder.
The operation of the model is based on cycles representing units of time. In every cycle, a peer either uploads and/ or downloads data or is idle, and at the end of every cycle, it may switch swarms. Peers attempt to download all s files in random order.
In a credit-based community, every peer p is initialized with an amount C p of credit, and in an SRE-based community, every peer is initialized with a download amount equal to F and a sharing ratio that is a uniformly random number between 0 and 2. A peer can and will only start leeching its next file if its credit or its sharing ratio is at least equal to its target threshold, otherwise it continues seeding the current file.
Based on real-world observations, we implement two user behaviors: lazy-seeding and over-seeding (see details in Section 2.1). The target threshold of a lazy-seeding peer is an amount F of credit in a credit-based community (enough to start and complete leeching a new file) and a sharing ratio equal to the SRE threshold in an SRE-based community. The condition for a lazy-seeding peer p at time t to stop seeding is c p ðtÞ ! 0, with
where u p ðtÞ and d p ðtÞ represent the total amounts of upload and download of peer p. Over-seeding peers behave in a similar way, but in both credit-based and SREbased communities they aim at large sharing ratios. Throughout this paper, we choose a sharing ratio of 2 as the default target threshold for over-seeding peers.
We have run several tests using different values for the threshold and the results show that the tendency of the problem is the same.
SYSTEMIC RISK: CRASH AND CRUNCH
In this section, we explore the credit dynamics in private communities and we analyze the conditions under which a community will crash, crunch, or be sustainable. We define a crash as a situation in which due to credit abundance, peers are not incentivized to contribute and the system completely seizes up, providing no upload or download to any peers. We define a crunch as a situation in which due to credit shortages, peers cannot afford new downloads and the system seizes up. We define a community to be sustainable if it does not crash or crunch.
Experimental Setup
We consider a closed system without new peer arrivals. Peer arrivals bring credit into the system and make it difficult to identify whether the underlying credit dynamics is due to the enforcement policy or to the new credit. In fact, in reality many private communities are (nearly) closed The simulation is based on the basic model introduced in Section 3, with N ¼ 1;000, s ¼ 100, F ¼ 10 units, and U ¼ 4 units per cycle. The small file size means the simulation runs produce results at a large scale of granularity. We also performed runs with F ¼ 100 and found no significant difference in results. We choose ¼ 0:7 as the default value of the SRE threshold, as it is used in many private communities, for example, [2], [3]. Tests using different values for show that the tendency of the problem stays the same, but with different speeds of entering crash or crunch. For each experiment, we perform 10 independent runs, and each run is executed for 2,000 cycles.
Credit Based: Constant Credit
As discussed in Section 3, the amount of credit in a creditbased community is always equal to the initial credit allocated by the community administrators. In this experiment, we vary the fraction of peers who are given an initial credit of F (and other peers are given zero credit), which we call rich peers, thus generating different levels of credit in the system. Table 1 shows the results of the system containing only lazy-seeding peers. Here, the throughput is expressed as the total amounts of units of data exchanged in the system over an entire run, normalized to the highest one observed in all the experiments. When the fraction of rich peers is initialized to 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7, we see sustainable outcomes with increasing throughput and a smaller number of seeders. We have run extended runs up to 20,000 cycles and find that the sustainable outcomes are maintained. This is intuitive because as the amount of credit in the system increases, fewer peers are poor, and hence more exchange of data can occur.
When 10 percent of peers are initialized as rich, the system crunches with all peers being seeders; and when 90 percent of peers are initialized as rich, the system crashes with all peers being leechers. Inspection of individual runs shows that crunches and crashes happen quickly-within the first 10 cycles or so. This is reflected in the low (almost zero) throughput under crash and crunch states. It is interesting to see that when the initial fraction of rich peers is set to 0.8, both sustain and crash outcomes can occur. This is reflected in the high variance of the throughput. Here, we are very close to the threshold leading to a crash and we find path dependency based on initial random conditions leading to either a high sustainable throughput, or a sudden crash otherwise.
When there is any number of over-seeding peers, we find that the system eventually crunches, and the speed of the crunch depends on the number of over-seeding peers. This is intuitive since in our experiments, over-seeding peers seed (to hoard credit) until they have a sharing ratio larger than 2-they eventually hold all the credit in the system and a crunch is inevitable.
SRE Based: Dynamic Credit
As discussed above, a credit-based community keeps a delicate constant amount of credit which, if not properly set, will lead the system to crunch or crash. On the other hand, as stated in Section 3, an SRE-based system keeps dynamic credit by allowing peers with sharing ratios less than one to mint some credit. Hence, essentially lazy-seeding peers in an SRE-based community inject credit into circulation, and as in a credit-based community, over-seeding peers absorb credit from circulation.
Intuitively, an SRE-based system cannot be sustainable if all peers are lazy-seeding: soon they will inject too much credit into circulation, which eventually leads the system to a crash. However, with the existence of over-seeding peers who absorb credit from circulation, the effect of creditinjecting by lazy-seeding peers can be alleviated and the system might eventually be sustainable.
We run several simulations to validate the above hypotheses. We consider an SRE-based system in which we vary the fraction of over-seeding peers. As shown in Table 2 , a certain fraction of over-seeding peers (0.3 and 0.4 in our experimental settings) does lead the SRE-based community to be sustainable. A too small or a too large fraction of over-seeding peers (0.1 and 0.5 in our experimental settings), on the other hand, eventually leads the system to crash or crunch. In this section, we derive (approximate) conditions for predicting crunches and crashes and we design a novel adaptive credit intervention mechanism for maintaining the sustainability.
Predicting Crashes and Crunches
In the model introduced in Section 3, suppose that at time t, a swarm ' has x ' ðtÞ leechers and y ' ðtÞ seeders. Denoting the fraction of the file that a leecher 
Let X ' ðtÞ and Y ' ðtÞ, respectively, represent the sets of leechers and seeders that, assuming that the situation does not change from time t, are able to achieve their target thresholds and start new downloads. Together with (2), we have
Now, we estimate the remaining download time of leechers and the remaining seeding time of seeders for the current file. Here, we assume that during the upload process, leechers and seeders alike upload with their full capacity U and distribute their upload capacity equally across all the leechers they are uploading to. The estimated remaining download time T ' i ðtÞ of leecher x ' i can be expressed as
Similarly, the estimated remaining time for a seeder y ' j to achieve its target threshold and stop seeding is
where
We can now formulate the condition for a crunch to happen in the system as the condition that the sets X ' ðtÞ and Y ' ðtÞ are both empty for all swarms ' at some time t, because that no leechers or seeders are able to earn enough credit to leave their swarms. As a consequence, by the time that the last leecher finishes its download, there will be no exchange of credit in the whole system.
To formulate the condition for a crash to happen, let P ' ðtÞ :¼ fx ' i : x ' i 6 2 X ' ðtÞg be the set of leechers in swarm ' who will need to seed after finishing their current downloads to achieve their target thresholds. Then, the condition for a crash to happen is for all swarms ' at some time t. Note that the system crashes if there are no seeders. The first part of the condition above says that all the seeders in the system will be able to earn enough credit to leave their swarms. If in addition none of the leechers in P ' ðtÞ can finish its download before the last existing seeder leaves the swarm and if this happens to all the swarms (the second part of the condition), then the whole system will end up with no seeders and a credit crash will occur.
Adaptive Credit for Sustainability
We design a novel adaptive credit intervention mechanism to avoid crashes and crunches. At each cycle, we check the conditions for crunches and crashes derived in Section 5.1. When the system is destined for a crunch, it applies freeleech 4 where leechers do not pay any credit for downloading, but seeders and other uploaders are still credited for uploading. Hence, new credit is injected into the system. Credit injection for stimulating the economy has often been used successfully in real world situations [19] . When the system is destined for a crash, it applies freeseed where seeding peers (and uploading leechers) do not receive any credit for uploading, but leechers still pay credit for downloading. Hence, credit is removed from the system. We use the credit-based system as an example to evaluate our strategies, but the same analysis can be applied to an SRE-based system. The experimental setup is the same as in Section 4.
In a credit-based system containing only lazy-seeding peers, all runs produce a sustainable outcome, including those previously led to crunches and crashes, i.e., with 0.1 and 0.9 fraction of rich peers at start. Fig. 4a (Fig. 4b) shows how a crunch (crash) is avoided via the activation of freeleech (freeseed) at several cycles-note the increase (decrease) in credit over time.
As stated in Section 4, any number of over-seeding peers in a credit-based community will eventually lead to a crunch. Fig. 5 shows the throughput in the system with 1 percent peers being over-seeding-crunches are prevented when the adaptive credit intervention mechanism is applied. However, the throughput of the system in the 4 . Freeleech is sometimes also used in existing private communities such as CHDBits, but in a more empirical manner. latter case is still very low, because the adaptive credit intervention mechanism does not attempt to optimize the system. In later sections, we provide a more thorough analysis on optimizing the system, i.e., improving the userlevel performance.
Discussion
While freeleech and freeseed policies effectively avoid crunches and crashes, they temporarily suspend the original incentive for contributions, which could lead to reduced performance if users learn to game the system by only downloading during freeleech periods and not seeding during freeseed periods. A refinement that will help preserve incentives is to reduce the freeseed and freeleech "tax" amount: rather than having leechers not pay anything at all for downloading and seeders not being credited for uploading, they can be charged or credited for a fraction, say 50 percent. Further, the taxation amount can also be variable and be applied in a continuous fashion. We explore this later in Section 7.
Until now, we have analyzed the sustainability of a P2P community that adopts a credit-based or SRE-based policy. However, the sustainability of the system only ensures that the system is able to function, but does not guarantee it will function well (recall Fig. 5 for an example of a sustainable system with low performance). To explore this, in the following sections we analyze and improve the user-level performance in sustainable P2P communities. There, we take sharing ratio enforcement as an example, but our analysis is also applicable to the credit-based policy, because it is only a special case of SRE with a threshold equal to one.
USER-LEVEL PERFORMANCE: THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF SRE
In this section, we show the user-level performance under SRE. Based on simulations, we examine the influence of several parameters and we exhibit the main reasons for the positive and negative effects of SRE.
Experimental Setup
In We use the same simulator and consider the same initial settings as in Section 3, except that now we consider 100 initial peers and five swarms in the system. In each cycle, new peers arrive according to a certain arrival rate (1 or 10 peers per cycle in our simulations) and they join a random swarm to download. After the first download, they maintain a sharing ratio above their target thresholds. Each peer (with upload capacity 1 unit per cycle) attempts to download all the five files (with size of 10 units) in the system, in random order. We consider a bandwidth-homogeneous BitTorrent system unless otherwise indicated. We run the simulation for 2,000 cycles and keep a record of peers who finish downloading all the files by the end of the simulation. The results represent the average of five runs.
The Imbalance of Bandwidth Supply and Demand
In our first experiment, we vary the fraction of over-seeding peers, thus generating different levels of oversupply. As shown in Fig. 6a , with the fraction of over-seeding peers increasing from 0.1 to 0.9, the average downloading speed is increased nearly 10 times. However, the average upload capacity utilization is significantly deteriorated and the seeding time is increased dramatically. With 50 percent over-seeding peers, on average each peer can only utilize less than 20 percent of its upload capacity (Fig. 6b ) and the seeding time of a lazy-seeding peer is nearly 200 times more than its downloading time, and for over-seeding peers, it even increases to over 400 times. On the other hand, with a smaller peer arrival rate (PAR) (which means a smaller demand) the imbalance and hence the performance are even worse. As shown in Fig. 6 , when the peer arrival rate decreases from 10 to 1 peer per cycle, with the same fraction of over-seeding peers, the average upload capacity utilization is decreased 2-3 times and the average seeding time is increased 2-5 times.
The Influence of the SRE Threshold
Many communities [2], [3] use 0.7 as the default value of the SRE threshold, empirically or intuitively. This section complements the necessary analysis behind the choice. Fig. 8 shows that with 50 percent over-seeding peers, when the SRE threshold is increased from 0.2 to 0.9, the upload capacity utilization decreases while the average seeding time increases. Surprisingly, with 10 percent over-seeding peers, the upload capacity utilization is first increased and then decreased. We believe this is due to, what we term as, the seeder's dilemma: with either a very small or a very large number of seeders, peers cannot well utilize their upload capacities. The former case is due to the piece availability problem: When there are not enough seeders, leechers have to exchange data with each other, which is not always possible because they only hold a part of the entire file. The latter case is due to the insufficient download demand. Without enough demand, though seeders have the will, they cannot find enough leechers to upload to.
The Discrimination against Peers with Limited Capacities
In this section, we analyze SRE's effects in bandwidthheterogeneous systems. We simulate a system with slow and fast peers. All the other settings are the same as in previous experiments, except that the upload capacity of fast (slow) peers is 4 (1) units per cycle. We change the fraction of fast peers from 0.1 to 0.9 and the results are shown in Fig. 7 . When 30 percent of the peers are over-seeding, slow peers need to seed 200 to 500 cycles more than fast peers. In general, slow peers need to seed four times as long as fast peers, which is the same as the ratio between the upload capacity of a fast and a slow peer. This result is also consistent with our previous theoretical results [10] . While fast and slow peers both put all their effort in participating in the community, slow peers need to seed much longer. We term this as SRE's discrimination against low-capacity peers. Together with the long seeding time and the low upload capacity utilization, the user-level performance is deteriorated. In the following section, we propose four strategies to alleviate these problems.
PROPOSED STRATEGIES
Inspired by ideas in social sciences and economics, in this section, we propose four strategies aimed at alleviating the negative effects of incentive policies used in private BitTorrent communities, which require only a minor revision of those policies.
Strategy Description
Negative taxation is used to describe the supplemental pay from the government to people earning below a certain amount [9] . Under this strategy, the upload amount of a peer is calculated as its actual upload amount multiplied by the coefficient T ¼ maxfminf1=SR; g; 1g, where SR represents its sharing ratio and represents the maximum negative taxation degree. In fact, this strategy reduces the SRE threshold individually for each peer to only 1=T of the original one, where 1 T . To still avoid free-riding to a reasonable extent, a small value of is desirable. In our simulations, we set ¼ 2.
Welfare for the rich is used to describe the bestowal of grants and tax-breaks to the wealthy [14] . Under this strategy, the upload amount of a peer is calculated as its actual upload amount multiplied by the coefficient W ¼ maxfminfSR; 'g; 1g, where ' represents the maximum welfare degree. In fact, this strategy reduces the desired sharing ratio of an over-seeding peer to 1=W of its original one, where 1 W '. In this way, over-seeding peers may achieve their desired sharing ratio and leave oversupplied swarms sooner. To prevent they leave too quickly, a small value of ' is desirable. In our simulation, we set ' ¼ 2.
Remuneration according to effort is introduced in participatory economics [4] , where people are paid according to the effort rather than the amount of contribution. Measuring the effort in terms of the seeding time, we propose SRE with counting seeding time, where a peer can start a new download when either it has achieved the SRE threshold or it has seeded for a sufficiently long time, which equals the size of the shared file divided by its upload capacity in our simulation. In this way, peers that are stuck in long seeding process in oversupplied swarms can leave and perform further downloads, which helps to balance the bandwidth demand and supply in the system. Note that because over-seeding peers are deposit-oriented, they still start new downloads only when they have achieved their desired sharing ratios.
Supply-based price. Taking inspiration from the law of supply and demand [6] , we propose SRE with supply-based price, in which the download amount of a peer is calculated as its actual download amount multiplied by the price P ¼ maxf1=SLR; g. The price is inversely correlated with the supply in the swarm, which is measure by the seeder-toleecher ratio. In an oversupplied swarm, a leecher pays less and it is less likely for it to have an insufficient sharing ratio and thus stay as a seeder. In this way, the oversupply is mitigated and the strategy gives a way to escape out of the seeder's dilemma as described in Section 6.3. A similar argument is also applicable in an undersupplied swarm. Here, represents the lowest price, which is used to prevent strategic users to only join swarms with extreme low prices.
In our simulation, we set ¼ 0:1. Note that the freeleech strategy proposed in Section 5.2 is an extreme with the price equal to 0.
Strategy Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of the new strategies through simulations. The experimental setup is the same as in Section 6 and results are shown in Figs. 9 and 10. From Fig. 9d , we see that by using any of the new strategies, peers achieve higher upload capacity utilizations and shorter seeding times. Particularly, SRE with supplybased price performs stably when the fraction of overseeding peers increases and it achieves the best performance in reducing the seeding time for all peers, which is reduced by three orders of magnitude. We believe the main reason is that, as stated in Section 7.1, SRE with supply-based price adaptively adjusts the supply and demand in a swarm.
While the seeding time is dramatically reduced, as a tradeoff, the average downloading speed is decreased (Fig. 9d) , hence the downloading time is increased. However, given that in our simulations we consider files with size equal to 10 units, the increase of the downloading time (tens of cycles) is negligible compared to the decrease of the seeding time (hundreds or even thousands of cycles). Further, when the system is consisted by both fast and slow peers, we see from Fig. 10 that all the proposed strategies effectively alleviate SRE's discrimination against low-capacity peers: with 30 percent over-seeding peers, the difference between the seeding times of fast and slow peers are reduced from hundreds to tens of cycles.
DYNAMIC FILE POPULARITY
So far, we have only considered scenarios in which all files have the same constant popularity. However, many measurement studies [5] , [12] show that the popularity of a file decreases quickly after it is first published. In this section, we analyze the effects of SRE and evaluate our proposed strategies under dynamic file popularity.
Experimental Setup
We use the same simulator and consider the same initial settings as in Section 3, except that to better abstract the effects of dynamic file popularity, we only consider one swarm with decreasing popularity. The simulation starts with one injector, who stays in the swarm as a permanent seeder. In successive cycles, new peers arrive according to an exponentially decreasing arrival rate (ðtÞ ¼ 0 e À t ), a peer arrival pattern that has been observed in many BitTorrent swarms [17] . Each peer joins the swarm with zero upload and downloads amounts. After a peer finishes its download, it seeds, if necessary, until it achieves its target threshold.
By default, we set 30 percent peers to be over-seeding. As shown in Section 6, this percentage is typical for showing the effects of SRE. We choose 0 ¼ 10 and ¼ 300 and we run the simulation for 2,000 cycles. All together 3,000 peers are included. We have also tested different values for 0 and , which give very similar results.
The Effects of SRE under Dynamic File
Popularity: Arrive Sooner to Avoid Long Seeding Time
We first demonstrate the effects of SRE under dynamic file popularity. Note that a smaller peer ID means an earlier arrival time. As shown in Fig. 11a , after the first 30 cycles, the swarm is occupied with hundreds of seeders but only with very few leechers. The presence of existing seeders increases the difficulty for a new seeder to achieve its target threshold and leave the swarm, and vice versa. We term this as cumulative seeder effect. As a consequence, peers that arrive later experience much longer seeding times. Fig. 9 . Strategy performance under different fractions of lazy-seeding peers and over-seeding peers. Fig. 10 . Alleviating discrimination. Fig. 11 . SRE under dynamic popularity.
As shown in Fig. 11b , to achieve the target thresholds, the first 500 peers only need to seed tens of cycles. After this, the seeding time increases quickly to hundreds or even thousands of cycles.
Proposed Strategies under Dynamic Popularity
As stated in Section 7.2, SRE with counting seeding time and SRE with supply-based price achieve the best performance in alleviating the side effects of SRE. In this section, we evaluate their performance under dynamic file popularity. We see from Fig. 12 that SRE with counting seeding time dramatically alleviates the oversupply: except for the large number of seeders during the first 200 cycles, the instantaneous number of seeders is almost always under 100. Without the oversupply, the seeding times of all peers are also dramatically decreased to less than 100 cycles. And as shown in Fig. 13 , SRE with supply-based price effectively stabilizes the supply: the instantaneous number of seeders stays stable after 200 cycles. With this constant supply (and not oversupply), peers experience much shorter seeding times compared to adopting the original SRE. Meanwhile, peers who arrive too early or too late have relatively longer seeding times than other peers. The former case is due to the high price for downloading when the swarm is occupied with much more leechers than seeders; in the latter case, few new peers arrive and the lack of demand increases the seeding time.
RELATED WORK
This paper is based on two previous papers [10] , [18] with extensions including demonstrating detailed measurement results, unifying the analysis of SRE-based and credit-based private communities, analyzing the systemic risk of SREbased private communities, as well as the influence of swarm popularity.
Several P2P incentive schemes based on credits have been proposed in the literature. Vishnumurthy et al. [20] present a system involving a virtual currency called Karma, whose amount in the system is maintained to avoid inflation and deflation. Kash et al. [11] show that in a scrip system where agents can consume and produce services, both an overabundance of money supply and its shortage lead to inefficiency. They also consider hoarders and how to optimize the credit supply. Our work is different in that we apply multiple user behaviors rather than focusing only on one that optimizes the utility. In addition, we focus on detecting and avoiding extreme crashes and crunches.
As stated, for grounding our work we chose the realm of private communities. Chen and Chu [7] compare 13 private communities with two public ones and show their differences in torrent evolution, user behaviors, and content distribution. Liu et al. [15] also perform measurement studies and further develop a model to show that SRE indeed provides effective incentives, but is vulnerable to collusion. Andrade et al. [5] focus on the dynamics of resource demand and supply, and they show that users typically try to increase their contribution levels by seeding for longer and not by providing more bandwidth. However, our paper shows that providing limited bandwidth is not the will of users, but it is a consequence of the oversupply. Chen et al. [8] also notice the oversupply problem and provide a model to identify the optimal stable SLR range. However, they did not propose strategies to solve the problem. Kash et al. [12] demonstrate that in a private community named DIME, after a period of freeleech, there are more download activities in the community. This is consistent with our theoretical result that during a precrunch state, injecting credit will increase the system throughput. While these papers mainly perform measurement-based studies, our paper is based on measurement, theoretical model, as well as extensive simulations. Further, we propose new strategies that effectively alleviate SRE's negative effects.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the effects of credit-based and SRE-based incentive policies employed in private P2P communities, from both the system-level and the user-level performance perspective.
Based on two user behaviors abstracted from real-world observations, i.e., lazy-seeding and over-seeding, we examine the system-level credit dynamics and show that crunches and crashes can easily happen in private communities. We apply a theoretical analysis to characterize the conditions that lead to these extreme outcomes, based on which we design an adaptive credit intervention mechanism that proactively stops the system from seizing by temporarily changing the credit policies. A system that is predicted to crunch allows freeleech, and conversely, a system that is predicted to crash imposes freeseed. Simulation results show that our mechanism is very effective in avoiding crunches and crashes.
Given a private community that is sustainable, we further analyze its user-level performance. Our simulation results show that under SRE, swarms tend to be extremely oversupplied. Although achieving an increase in the average downloading speed, the oversupply induces undesired effects including low upload capacity utilizations, extremely long seeding times, and an unfair playing field for late entrants into swarms. We propose four strategies to alleviate these problems. Particularly, SRE with supply-based price maintains a system-wide high downloading speed, achieves stable high upload capacity utilizations, and reduces seeding durations by three orders of magnitude as compared to the original SRE. When then the adaptive intervention mechanism is run in the background to check the extreme conditions for crunches and crashed, the system is ensured to have a high and sustainable performance. Rameez Rahman received the PhD degree in "parallel and distributed systems" from Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands in 2011. He is currently serving as an assistant professor at Information Technology University, Lahore. He has invested his research efforts in utilizing interdisciplinary ideas for building new, socially intelligent ICT systems. Such works have not only led to the development of more robust, efficient and fair protocols (results which have been published in many prestigious venues), but can also open up vistas for social scientists to experimentally and empirically test the feasibility of various social principles, using ICT systems. He envisions that much of the research impetus in the near future, in the sciences in general, and ICT in particular, is going to come from developing countries such as Pakistan. Toward that end, he intends to play his small part in fostering a research culture in Pakistan that can facilitate the realization of this vision.
Tamá s Vinkó received the PhD degree in 2007 from the University of Szeged, Hungary. He was a research fellow at the European Space Agency and postdoc researcher at the Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands. He is currently an assistant professor at the University of Szeged, Hungary. His primary research interests include mathematical modeling and optimization of large-scale distributed systems.
Johan A. Pouwelse is an assistant professor at Delft University of Technology, specialized in peer-to-peer file sharing. He leads the P2P research team of a dozen people which created the Tribler P2P system. The Tribler group is the largest experimental research group in the field of P2P and responsible for several world-first innovations. With over one million downloads Tribler serves as a living laboratory and proving ground for next-generation P2P technology. He is the scientific director of P2P-Next and technical leader of QLectives, EU projects with a combined research budget of 26 million Euro. Previously, he delivered a statement for the FTC in Washington, was a visiting scientist at MIT, and spent several summers at Harvard to study mechanisms for cooperation. 
